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PROPERTY AS THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER†
ABSTRACT
In both his article Property as the Law of Things and his prior
work, Professor Henry Smith has revitalized property law theory by
emphasizing the architectural role that property plays in private law
and the ways in which modular property rights reduce information
costs and promote both property use and transfer. I applaud Smith’s
insistence that we focus on the systemic nature of property rights and
the benefits of bundled entitlements. At the same time, it is important
to understand the limitations of Smith’s analysis.
Property law goes beyond managing the complexity of human
interaction. Property not only presents a coordination problem but
also a constitutional problem. Many issues fundamental to property
law systems require attention to the norms, values, and ways of life
that a society embraces. The problem is not just how to grease the
wheels of social interaction; the problem is how to determine the
character of that interaction. Value choices must be made to
determine what property rights can be created, how many owners we
should have, who can become an owner, how long rights last, and
what obligations owners should have. Because we live in a free and
democratic society that treats each person with equal concern and
respect, we must interpret the fundamental values of liberty, equality,
and democracy to define the set of property rights that we can
recognize.
Property law is not simply about best management practices or
coordination in the face of scarcity. Democracies elect leaders who
pass laws that establish minimum standards for social and economic
relationships compatible with our justified expectations and our
considered judgments about what it means to treat others with dignity
and respect. Property law is not just a mechanism of coordination; it
is a quasi-constitutional framework for social life. Property is not
merely the law of things. Property is the law of democracy.

Copyright © 2014 Joseph William Singer.
† Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks and affection go to Martha
Minow, Mira Singer, Greg Alexander, Bethany Berger, Nestor Davidson, and Eduardo
Peñalver.
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No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States.
1

– U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 8

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness.
2

– The Declaration of Independence

INTRODUCTION
What is property? For most people, property means the things
we own. Lawyers, however, understand property as legal relations
3
among persons with respect to things. Some scholars deem property
to be a natural right while others view it as a delegation of sovereign
4
power or as a package of legal entitlements. Property evokes

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, introductory note (1936) (“The word
‘property’ is used in this Restatement to denote legal relations between persons with respect to
a thing.”).
4. Compare JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 69 (Richard Hildreth
trans., Oceana Publ’ns, Inc. 1975) (1802) (“Property and law are born together, and die
together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.”),
with Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV.
1549, 1568 (2003) (stating that property is a natural right), and Morris R. Cohen, Property and
Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 9, 13 (1927) (stating that property is a delegation of sovereign
power).
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romantic images, such as “a room of one’s own” or “the American
Dream” or even (paradoxically) “theft.” Under any rubric or
conception, property suggests a stable basis of expectation with
respect to control of valued things. Stability is so important to our
image of property that four current Supreme Court Justices have
opined that no “established right of private property” can be altered
5
in any way without compensation. At the same time, though it is
undoubtedly true that justified expectations are crucial to property
law, it is also true that the actions and property rights of others can
affect our property and even impair or destroy its value. Others can
build their own homes and block our view. They can erect
McMansions that alter the nature of the neighborhood. They can
default on subprime loans, leaving abandoned homes that may
depress the market value of our own homes. They can compete with
us and put us out of business. They can adopt condominium rules that
limit what we can do in our own apartments. They can lobby for
changes in zoning laws that downzone the area and prevent us from
doing what we hoped to do with our own land. Property law may
protect our justified expectations, but it does not freeze them in place,
and it is not an easy or automatic process to determine when our
expectations are justified and when they are not justified.
In truth, we face hard choices in defining property rights. Where
one may see an established property right, another may, in good faith,
see a case that needs to be distinguished, narrowing the scope of the
6
property right in question. To figure out who is right when we
confront such issues, we need to know how to think about property
and property law. We need the right metaphors, frames of reference,
modes of analysis, and burdens of proof; we need these things
because they focus our attention in particular ways, clarifying some
issues and obscuring others. Let us say we want to think deeply about
property. Where should we focus our attention? What is most
important to notice about American property law?

5. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602
(2010) (plurality opinion).
6. See Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1369, 1383–84 (2013). In Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries,
Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978), for example, the majority found the case governed by the
absolute ownership rule with such confidence that it refused to apply the new law it adopted
retroactively. Id. at 25–27. Conversely, the dissenting judge distinguished the cases applying the
absolute ownership rule, found the rule wholly inapplicable, and deemed the current case to be
one of first impression. Id. at 33 (Pope, J., dissenting).
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Professor Henry Smith has revitalized traditional property law
scholarship by giving a spirited defense of some aspects of the
7
traditional legal doctrines governing estates in land. This
hypertechnical, abstruse set of rules appears removed from modern
policy concerns or values and increasingly lacks any understandable
justification. Nor has it been substantially modernized as were the
subjects of torts and contracts following the legal-realist revolution in
legal thought. Though Professor Wesley Hohfeld successfully
recharacterized property as comprising a bundle of rights rather than
a unified whole, Hohfeld’s scholarship did not result in significant
8
rationalization of the estates system. The estates system persisted
through the twentieth century despite other vast changes in the law
and became increasingly difficult to justify.
Why not abolish the estates system and allow owners to
disaggregate property rights as they see fit? The existing rules require
us to figure out what estate the grantor created, not what package of
property rights she intended to create. If the package of rights defined
by the grantor does not fit into an established estate, we choose
whichever estate is closest to what the grantor intended and we
ignore whatever is incompatible with that estate. When we do this,
some of what the grantor intended may be discarded and ruled out of
bounds and unenforceable. Why limit freedom of contract or free
disposition in this way? Smith has provided a possible answer to this
question. He argues that information cost economization gives us
reason to define packages of rights that go along with various forms
of ownership—rights in rem over things protected against everyone
9
else in the world. Arguing mostly in a mode that uses cost-benefit
analysis, Smith focuses on the structural role that estates play in the
10
property system. He goes further and argues that property’s
11
architecture plays a crucial role in private law more generally.
7. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012).
8. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). For explanation of the significance of
Hohfeld’s scholarship, see Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1056–59. Hohfeld’s scholarship
did help to combat Lochnerism by affirming the legitimacy of legislative regulation of property
rights, on the grounds that limitation of a few rights in the bundle did not necessarily result in a
deprivation of property without due process of law. See Hohfeld, supra, at 35 (noting that
privileges and rights can exist even when the other is lacking).
9. Smith, supra note 7, at 1693–94.
10. Id. at 1694.
11. Id.
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Part I explains the major contributions of Smith’s view. I then
argue that Smith’s focus on property law as a solution to a
coordination problem fails to address the ways in which property law
is also a constitutional problem. It may be true that we need to grease
the wheels of social interaction, but it is also true that we need to
judge and regulate the character of that interaction. Smith’s argument
depends on assumptions that he does not make explicit. We must
explicate these because property law implicates fundamental value
choices that must be addressed first before analyzing human
interaction and coordination within a chosen social and political
order.
Part II gives specific examples of the ways in which property law
shapes social life and both reflects and promotes fundamental values.
We see underlying value choices in determining what property rights
can be created, how many owners we should have, who can become
an owner, how long rights last, and what obligations owners should
have.
Part III widens the lens to explain the reasons we need to
consider the teachings of moral, political, and legal theory in addition
to economics to sensibly analyze and interpret the basic values of a
free and democratic society that treats each person with equal
concern and respect. Liberty, equality, and democracy are not selfdefining. They are essentially contested concepts and there is much
disagreement about what they mean. At the same time, there are also
large areas of overlapping consensus about what these values require.
Smith is right that the nature of the things we control through
property law should lead us to adopt certain appropriate strategies for
managing and coordinating our access to and our control of them.
Coordination, however, is only a problem because we live in a liberal
democracy comprised of free and equal persons. Understanding
coordination therefore requires an understanding of both freedom
and equality. Property is more than the law of things; property is the
law of democracy. Property law shapes social relations, and because
we live in a free and democratic society that aspires to treat each
person with equal concern and respect, a crucial function of property
law is to interpret what that means.
I. PROPERTY LAW AS BUNDLED RIGHTS IN THINGS
Professor Henry Smith has performed an invaluable service to
property law theory by conceptualizing property not simply as an
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individual right or bundle of rights but as a framework for
“interactions of persons in society” as well as the foundation and
12
infrastructure of private law. Smith asks us to think about property
13
as the “law of things.” This evocative metaphor not only harkens
back to William Blackstone’s grand distinction between the “rights of
14
persons” and the “rights of things” but also subtly dissents from the
legal realist conception of property as a bundle of rights with respect
15
to things. Smith agrees with the legal realists that property
ownership does comprise a bundle of rights, that those rights are not
16
absolute, and that some of them can be individually alienated. He
emphasizes, however, that the package of rights is not infinitely
malleable. Rather, some bundles of rights must stick together for the
17
property system to work properly. Rather than bundles of rights that
can be disaggregated at will, Smith argues for what I will call bundled
rights. Some packages of rights are crucial to the functioning of the
property system and the rest of private law as well. For this reason,
the law structures property rights into modules and places limits on
the power of owners to disaggregate the rights that are packaged in
18
these modules. Some bundles of rights support the property system
itself and cannot be dismantled without undermining the foundations
of the house. There is, Smith argues, a systemic logic to property and

12. Id. at 1691.
13. Id.
14. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *121 (titling Book the First “Of the Rights
of Persons”); 2 id. *1 (titling Book the Second “Of the Rights of Things”).
15. Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, introductory note (1936) (“The word
‘property’ is used in this Restatement to denote legal relations between persons with respect to
a thing.”); id. (“Legal relations between persons can be of widely differing types. Clarity of
thought and exactness of expression require the analysis and subdivision of legal relations into
types having different signifances. This analysis is made in §§ 1–4 defining respectively those
legal relations designated by the words ‘right,’ ‘privilege,’ ‘power’ and ‘immunity.’”); Hohfeld,
supra note 8, at 30–32 (explaining the analytical differences among rights, privileges, powers,
and immunities).
16. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1696, 1699, 1710 (incorporating these concepts into his
argument).
17. See id. at 1693 (“Property organizes this world into lumpy packages of legal relations—
legal things—by setting boundaries around useful attributes that tend to be strong
complements.”); see also Joseph William Singer, Essay, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a
Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1021 & n.44, 1022 (2009) (making this
point and arguing that Smith’s scholarship helps to emphasize and justify it).
18. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1693–94 (arguing that the property system depends on its
modular structure).
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property law that not only explains much of existing law but also gives
19
us a normative framework for judging it.
These insights have played an extremely helpful role in current
property theory. In recent years, the estates system has been going
20
out of fashion and taking up less time in many property law courses.
Property professors pay more attention these days than in the past to
trespass, covenants, easements, leases, zoning, and real-estate
transactions, not to mention intellectual property and regulatory
takings. In law practice, future interests are not the focus of housing
or of commercial real-estate transactions, though they remain
important for trusts and estates law. To the current generation, the
law of estates in land seems technical, bizarre, and antiquated. This is
partly because of its arcane terminology and partly because many
traditional rules have archaic justifications.
More importantly, the idea that there are only a few bundles of
rights one can create also contradicts the modern preference for
freedom of contract, evident in the myriad covenants, conditions, and
restrictions we see in property owners’ associations. Libertarians can
hardly be overjoyed about legal rules that force property transactions
into a few, preset bundles, rather than allow owners to disaggregate
21
property as they like. Progressives cannot be too attracted to rules
19. See id. at 1691–94.
20. Cf. D. Benjamin Barros, Toward a Model Law of Estates and Future Interests, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 17–20 (2009) (proposing a way to fix the unnecessary complexity of the
estates system); T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 513,
514–15 (2003) (arguing for reform of the estates system to reduce its complexity); Louise A.
Halper, Q. Why is this Course Different from All Other Courses? A. Maybe It’s Not, 22 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 965, 970 (1999) (reviewing JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW
AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998)) (noting the smaller
number of estates-related cases in a leading casebook).
21. I use the terms “libertarian,” “conservative,” “liberal,” and “progressive” in their
modern senses as used in contemporary political rhetoric. Broadly speaking, libertarians are
attracted to what they view as a “limited state” that protects individuals from harm, enforces
contracts, and protects property rights. They favor freedom of contract because they see it as a
core aspect of liberty; for that reason, they are likely to view with great suspicion any regulatory
rules that limit the packages of property rights that can be created because those packages
interfere with freedom of contract. Conservatives often adopt a libertarian stance toward
economic regulation (thus agreeing with libertarian views on freedom of contract), but they
tend to couple that commitment with support for regulations designed to promote “traditional
values” in the areas of sexuality and family life. Liberals or progressives tend to favor regulation
of market relations for a variety of reasons, such as fairness, distributional norms, and the
promotion of minimum standards for market relationships. Just as conservatives may flip their
deregulatory stance when dealing with matters of sex and family, liberals and progressives tend
to adopt a libertarian approach to such matters rather than the regulatory one they adopt with
respect to economic matters.
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that consolidate powers in owners while leaving nonowners without
access to the things they need. And efficiency theorists tend to talk
about property rights as if they were merely transaction costs—
impediments to the transfer of resources to those who value them
22
most highly. Against this united front, Smith shows us how things
would be much worse for us if we did not have a system of bundled
23
rights. He has presented a coherent picture of some reasons why
bundled rights matter and has convincingly demonstrated that
property law is part of the infrastructure of private law and a
foundation for social life.
To explain why property law plays this pivotal role, Smith argues
that property presents us with a complex coordination problem. We
24
need to “manage[] the complexity of human interactions.” Because
property concerns scarce resources and because people want to use
resources for their various purposes, we need a way to allocate
powers over those resources, especially use rights. When resources
are scarce, creating rules about property use is beneficial; however,
such rules are also costly to create, define, and enforce. Smith argues
that the focus of property law is to minimize the costs of information
25
we need to figure out who gets to do what with what thing. We do
this by granting specific things to owners, with a package of powers
“in rem” giving them general rights to control a thing against the
26
entire world. If we do this, we can minimize information costs by
27
allocating gatekeeping powers over particular things. Those powers
are protected by a general right to exclude others from particular
objects of property. This “exclusion strategy” not only grants owners
capacious powers to control things but also implies an architecture for
28
the entire property system. We divide the world into things and then
allocate those things among owners, giving them the power to exclude
22. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Essay, What Happened to Property in Law
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 380 (2001) (explaining how efficiency theorists tend to view
property as a bundle of rights that can be recombined or disaggregated at will to promote
human interests and arguing that such theorists do not sufficiently understand the ways that
limits on disaggregation of property rights might promote efficiency rather than simply impede
it).
23. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1720–22 (discussing the implications and advantages of his
approach).
24. Id. at 1725.
25. Id. at 1691, 1698, 1700–13.
26. Id. at 1702–08.
27. Id. at 1709–13.
28. Id. at 1709–16.
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others from things they own as well as general powers to use them
and transfer them. Then we establish public recording offices to make
it possible for anyone to find out who is the owner of each thing.
All this minimizes the costs of figuring out whom to talk to if you
want access to a thing you do not own, and it frees all of us from
having to explain to others our own decisions about how to use our
own things. Sometimes we disengage from this exclusion strategy and
ask the courts to engage in nuanced, contextual determinations of the
distribution and scope of particular property rights, but Smith argues
that we adopt this “governance strategy” only if the benefits of doing
29
so outweigh the costs. He emphasizes that we can generally
30
minimize costs by eschewing such contextual analyses. Governance
31
strategies are the exception, not the rule. Rather than treating each
case as a particular contextual problem about who gets to control the
property, Smith argues that we should see the structural reasons for
formal generalizations as well as preset packages of rights through
assignment of ownership and general rights to exclude, all of which
32
enable people to interact with others at manageable cost.
We all have reason to celebrate this new turn in property theory.
Smith has reminded libertarians that they not only favor freedom of
contract, but they also favor the rights of owners and their freedom
from undue limitations on their ability to choose how to use their own
property. It is easy to see how the freedom to disaggregate property
rights at will may wind up impinging on property rights and freedoms
that libertarians may cherish. Consider how limited our freedom
would be if we had to comply with limitations imposed by those who
33
owned our property in the 1640s. Consider the constraints we would
face if much of the land in the United States was inalienable because
34
it was “entailed” and destined to stay within a particular family.
Consider the federal statute that restored the rights of condominium
owners to fly the American flag from their balconies despite any

29. Id. at 1693–94, 1703–05.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1693–94.
33. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 7.1, at 300 (3d ed. 2010) (describing how
“land use was far from free because it was always intimately connected with services owed to a
higher lord, all the way up to the monarch”).
34. Id. § 7.7.1, at 323–25.
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condominium association rules to the contrary. Libertarians who
favor freedom of contract may have opposed that law, but others who
value the freedom of owners to use their property as they see fit may
have applauded it.
Progressives can also celebrate the notion that owners have
freedoms that cannot be taken away by private contract or will.
36
Consider the Fair Housing Act, which guarantees access to housing
37
without regard to race or religion, or the implied warranty of
38
habitability that guarantees tenants livable housing. Smith has also
reminded efficiency aficionados that markets cannot work without
the bundled property rights that form the basis for market
transactions and that minimize the costs of determining who gets to
control the things in the world. Property rights are not merely
impediments to resources ending up in the hands of those who value
them the most; they are one of the basic tools that allow markets to
exist in the first place. They are inherently valuable because they
enable people to act, to invest, to plan, and to exchange goods and
services. They establish bargaining power that protects individuals
from being forced to comply with the will of others; they are a
significant part of what makes free markets “free.”
39
Smith teaches property law scholars several crucial lessons.
First, he emphasizes that property is a system and not just an
individual entitlement. The recognition and exercise of property
rights inevitably affect others. Property rights and externalities are
40
born together; you cannot have one without the other. The
assignment of ownership to one person necessarily affects others by
giving the owner the power to exclude others from the resource even
35. Freedom To Display the American Flag Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-243, § 3, 120 Stat.
572, 572–73 (2006) (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 5 note (2012)).
36. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006).
37. Id. § 3604.
38. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“In our
judgment the common law itself must recognize the landlord’s obligation to keep his premises in
a habitable condition.”).
39. In addition to Smith’s article Property as the Law of Things, supra note 7, see generally,
for example, Merrill & Smith, supra note 22; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in
the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:
Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002); Henry E. Smith,
On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012); Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004).
40. Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of Ownership,
in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 57, 59 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds.,
2010).
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if they need it. Externalities only come into play if we have property
rights because, in a state of nature unencumbered by law, everyone
acts to further their own interests. There is no basis for saying that
something wrongly impinges on others if we do not have a sense of
what we have a right to be protected from. Given that law identifies
the interests that deserve legal protection, we can only determine
whether an action causes an externality by reference to a normative
framework that distinguishes self-regarding from other-regarding
actions.
Because property rights necessarily affect others, they must be
regulated to ensure that they are compatible with the property and
personal rights of others. The scope of a property right depends on
the effects on others with whom we are willing to live. An owner’s
interest in controlling a thing cannot be viewed in isolation from the
interests of others. Property rights must be tailored to ensure that
they are mutually compatible with each other, and the distribution
and packaging of property rights must be structured so that they work
over time, given the realities of human life. Creating an architecture
for property law must take into account the systemic effects of various
bundles of rights as they are exercised over time. That requires
limiting the ability of owners to unbundle property rights when doing
so undermines the smooth functioning of the system itself.
Second, Smith asks us to focus on the basic structure of the
property system. In so doing, he reminds us that property rights must
be defined prior to markets; they are a foundation upon which
markets rest. We cannot act unless we are free to act in some place;
no property rights, no markets. We cannot buy something if we do
not have entitlements to exchange with others; no property rights, no
contracts. And we cannot make choices about what to do without
having capacious powers over discrete objects in the world; no
property rights, no freedom. Property rights precede actions,
contracts, and markets. In important ways, property precedes both
liberty and efficiency.
Property precedes liberty because we cannot decide how to live
if we are not given general powers to choose how to use the things we
own. If we have to ask permission for each thing we want to do, or if
we have to consult a list to make sure we are not engaging in a
prohibited action, we will be inhibited from living our lives on our
own terms. Property precedes efficiency because we cannot use
market values to define property rights since market values are
dependent on an initial distribution of property that is then
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exchanged within those markets. Determining what individuals are
willing and able to pay for an entitlement requires positing a
distribution of property before the efficiency analysis even begins.
This does not mean that efficiency analysis cannot help us think about
the appropriate distribution of property; Smith and Professor Thomas
41
Merrill have explained why property matters to economic analysis.
But it does mean that the kind of analysis we use to choose the basic
structure of property law may be different from the kind of analysis
we use to determine the scope of rights within the system.
Third, Smith reminds us that there are good reasons why the law
42
places distinct limits on our freedom to disaggregate property rights.
There are some bundles of rights we are not, and should not, be
allowed to create. Property comes in discrete modules that enable us
to know what we own and what we can do with it. Those modules not
only give us valuable information; they free us from unwarranted
restrictions. They enable us to deal with others on terms we can
understand. They protect our justified expectations by enabling us to
know what rights we get when we buy something. They free us from
having to bargain about every basic thing we expect to get when we
engage in a transaction. They allow us to take certain things for
43
granted. For example, we have abolished the fee tail and most
restraints on alienation of fee simple interests to ensure both free use
44
of land and transferability. We have passed consumer protection
45
laws in every state to ensure that we get what we pay for. We have
building-construction codes, housing codes, and zoning laws to ensure
46
that our property is safe and protected from incompatible uses. The
set of bundled rights we are entitled to create must be limited by law
to promote both freedom and efficiency.
In sum, Smith argues that the systemic, foundational, and
modular nature of property implies that it can function only within
41. Merrill & Smith, supra note 22, at 398.
42. See generally Smith, supra note 7 (arguing that a modular theory of property, in which
certain rights are grouped together, provides a better explanation of property law than a theory
of detachable sticks).
43. Joseph William Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 157–58 (2012).
44. SINGER, supra note 33, § 7.7.1, at 323–25.
45. See generally CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND
PRACTICES STATUTES (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/reportudap-50-states.pdf.
46. See infra notes 145–55 and accompanying text.
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the framework of a workable architecture. Property law provides that
47
architecture. I wholeheartedly support these insights, and Smith’s
care in formulating and explaining them marks an invaluable
contribution to our understanding of both property as a social
institution and of property law. At the same time, there are
limitations to the way Smith analyzes the architecture of property law.
He focuses on property as a coordination problem or as problem of
minimizing the costs of managing the complexity of human
48
interaction.
Though these issues are both important and
fundamental to the property system, they take our attention away
from values and value choices that are not only basic elements of
property law but are also fundamental to both private and public law
more generally.
Smith is quite right that property poses a coordination problem,
but property also poses a constitutional problem. By constitutional I
do not mean to refer only to constitutional law, but to the fact that
property institutions are fundamental to social life, moral norms,
49
political power, and the rule of law. Property institutions not only
regulate the complexity of human interaction, but also shape the
character of those interactions. Property is not only about the
allocation of scarce resources, the management of complex
information, or the coordination of land use among competing users;
it is about our way of life. If this is true, then property law should
reflect and shape our deepest values. Property is not just about
information or complexity; it is about promoting “Life, Liberty and
50
the Pursuit of Happiness.” Information costs help us manage in the
world, but they are neither the only thing we care about nor the most
important. Property is about the social order; it reflects and enables
our conception of what it means to live in a free and democratic
51
society that treats each person with equal concern and respect.
Smith argues that there is a structural logic to property law that
is helpful no matter what purposes we have or what values we

47. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1700 (arguing that “[t]here is a basic architecture of
property, and many features of property follow from it”).
48. See id. at 1699 (arguing that the “architecture [of property] responds . . . to the problem
of managing the complexity of interactions between private parties with respect to a variety of
attributes of resources in a world of positive delineation costs”).
49. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 1–2 (1997).
50. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
51. ALEXANDER, supra note 49, at 1–2; Singer, supra note 43, at 167.
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cherish. He hopes to eschew reliance on any particular moral or
52
political theory such as utilitarianism. His normative goal is to
analyze what makes property systems work well at minimum cost,
53
given the realities of human life. He wants to focus on the structures
of property that are necessary to enable any legitimate values to be
54
promoted. Yet despite these ambitions, Smith does not eschew value
choices. Indeed, he makes a number of legitimate but unstated
normative assumptions about the values that a property system
should promote. He assumes (1) that every person is entitled to
become an owner, (2) that opportunities to acquire property are
freely available, (3) that ownership is widely dispersed, (4) that
owners are presumptively free to use their property as they wish and
to determine the course of their own lives, and (5) that people are
entitled to quiet enjoyment of their property. These are widely shared
norms that reflect widely shared values. The property system whose
structure Smith analyzes embodies the values of liberty, equality, and
stability, among others. But these norms are not self-defining even if
the Declaration of Independence would have us view them as selfevident. These values require interpretation. Failure to address the
meaning of these values directly prevents us from seeing the
foundational choices needed to create a property law system
compatible with these values.
Smith’s focus on the costs and benefits of alternative strategies
for organizing property rights inevitably utilizes economic theory
more intensively than other potentially relevant frames of reference
or methods of analysis. But we can neither understand our property
law system nor adequately judge it unless we supplement economic
analysis with the disciplines of moral theory, political philosophy,
55
history, and legal theory. Property law in contemporary America is

52. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1719 (suggesting that property law promotes a variety of
values, including “efficiency, fairness, justice, and virtue”).
53. See id. at 1691–94.
54. Cf. id. at 1725 (mentioning a number of potential “goals” of property law, such as
“autonomy, privacy, investment, planning, and appropriability according to criteria of
efficiency, fairness, and morality”).
55. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 43, at 144; Joseph William Singer, Property Law as the
Infrastructure of Democracy, Lecture at the University of Florida Levin College of Law (2011),
in 11 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY WFL11-1, WFL11-3 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2013)
[hereinafter Singer, Infrastructure of Democracy]; Joseph William Singer, The Anti-Apartheid
Principle in American Property Law, 1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 91, 109 (2011) [hereinafter
Singer, Anti-Apartheid Principle]; cf. Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers,
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not only about the allocation of scarce resources, but also about the
legal framework of a free and democratic society that treats each
person with equal concern and respect. Property is not just a choice
between exclusion and governance strategies; it is a choice between
feudalism and democracy, between slavery and freedom, between
bureaucratic expertise and electoral politics, between stability and
change, between a libertarian conception of freedom and a liberal
one, between the norms of formal equality and the norm of equal
opportunity. Property affects polity. Property may be the law of
things, but property is also the law of democracy.
56
Smith argues that property forms the baseline for private law. I
agree. He also argues that we should consider the best structure for
property law before looking into the values that property should
57
promote. He suggests that we want a system that allows us to best
achieve our values at the lowest cost, no matter what those values
happen to be. But the norms associated with a free and democratic
society imply structural constraints of their own. They are not things
we can add on later; they inform the basic structure of property rights.
Smith does not ignore such values; he simply assumes them. But
anyone who pays attention to contemporary American politics will
immediately recognize that we have fundamental value conflicts
about the meaning of liberty, equality, and democracy. Depending on
our conception of those concepts, we will define the basic structure of
property law very differently.
Smith is right that property has an architecture that forms a
foundation for social life, but property also has a constitution—a set
of norms and values that defines the legitimate social relationships
that can be recognized in a free and democratic society that treats
each person with equal concern and respect. We could manage the
complexity of human interaction by creating a dictatorship and giving
all property to a supreme leader. We could abolish all regulatory
laws, allowing owners to do whatever they like with their property.
We could allow people to choose to become slaves if they wish. We
could delegate power to an established church to divvy up property in
light of religious doctrine. We could disable women from owning

56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 906 (2009) [hereinafter Singer, Normative Methods] (arguing that
lawyers should apply principles from “moral and political theory”).
56. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1703 (“[M]odules . . . permit private law to manage highly
complex interactions among private parties.”).
57. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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property. We could segregate housing by race. We could abolish
corporations. We could allow condominium associations to regulate
the intimate details of life for their inhabitants, or we could free unit
owners from oppressive restrictions. We could protect homeowners
from being deceived by subprime mortgage sales tactics, or we could
live with laissez faire. We could allow landlords to use self-help to
evict tenants at will by putting their belongings on the street at a
moment’s notice, or we could require court evictions to end tenancies.
We could give landlords the power to regulate tenants’ personal lives,
or we could prohibit that. All these possibilities would have effects on
information costs and the complexity of human relationships. But
they would also fundamentally affect our way of life.
The values of a free and democratic society are both more
fundamental and more contested than the value of minimizing
information costs or the value of managing complex human
interactions. The question is not just how to simplify human
interactions; the question is how to define the minimum standards for
human interactions compatible with the values of a free and
democratic society that treats each person with equal concern and
respect. Information costs are important to the structure of property
law, but political, moral, and rule of law norms must be satisfied first.
Costs of human interaction become relevant only within a normative
framework that defines what kinds of property arrangements are
compatible with the ideals of freedom, equality, and democracy.
Importantly, not all costs can be quantified, and many important
features of property law cannot be explained by reference to
monetary costs. Both the architecture of the property system and also
the technical details of some property law doctrines depend on norms
of morality and justice that embody our deepest values. Rather than a
quantitative problem of how to minimize costs or a structural problem
of how to manage complexity, we face an interpretive problem of how
to define the values that shape the legal infrastructure of a free and
democratic society. That means we also confront a normative problem
of how to define the contours of social relationships that treat each
person with equal concern and respect and that are compatible with
the values of a free and democratic society.
Smith does not ignore the values of freedom, equality, and
democracy. Indeed, his cost-minimization program is designed to
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58

promote all those values. My argument is that property theorists
need to pay as much attention to the contested concepts of liberty,
equality, and democracy as they do to efficiency and to costs and
benefits. Smith is absolutely correct that property law is about the
architecture of private law and the management of complex human
interactions, but it is also about the infrastructure of a free and
democratic society, and that requires analysis and interpretation of
fundamentally contested normative concepts. Smith’s insights depend
on a normative framework that is implicit in his analysis; the
normative framework merits separate attention because we cannot
engage in meaningful analysis of information costs (or any other
costs) without first discussing the social and legal framework within
which those costs are computed. Cost-minimization analysis will come
out very differently if the framework is a libertarian one or a liberal
one; it will similarly be different depending on whether utilitarianism,
rights, fairness and justice, or virtue theory are the animating
normative impulses. If we widen the lens to include the insights of
political and moral theory, as well as the traditions of the common
law and the norms associated with the rule of law, we will see the
constitutional questions lurking behind the coordination dilemmas
upon which Smith focuses his attention. We will see why property is
the law of democracy.
II. PROPERTY, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER
Professor Henry Smith wisely proposes that we consider the
deep structure of property law. That means going back to first
principles. If we take this advice seriously, then it becomes evident
that property law is a constitutional problem because the norms and
values of a free and democratic society limit the kinds of property
rights that can be created. Not only do democracies limit the kinds of
property rights that can be recognized, but they also have something
to say about how many people can be owners, who can become an
owner, how long their rights last, and what obligations go along with
their rights.
A. What Kinds of Property Rights Can a Democracy Recognize?
Property law does more than manage the complexity of human
interactions to ensure low-cost coordination among people with

58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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regard to control of things. Property law establishes a baseline for
social relations compatible with democracy, both as a political system
and a form of social life. Property law not only simplifies and
promotes human interaction, but it also entails substantive choices
about the type and scope of property rights that a free and democratic
society can recognize without violating its deepest values. We have,
for example, abolished feudalism, slavery, primogeniture, male
control of marital property, racial segregation, the fee tail, and
59
debtors’ prisons. We have abolished self-help in landlord-tenant
relations; we prohibit landlords from putting the tenant’s belongings
on the street if a rent check is a day late. We require landlords to
provide habitable housing. We have abolished strict foreclosure of
mortgages. We have abolished racially restrictive covenants. We have
enacted zoning and environmental laws and we have protected
60
consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices. The host of
regulations we see both in state and federal law establishes minimum
standards for social relationships compatible with our choice to live in
a democracy and to promote freedom and equality. Basic democratic
values limit the kinds of property rights that the law will recognize,
and they define particular bundles of rights that cannot be created.
The modules that define the basic components of the property system
must satisfy these fundamental norms first before we can shape them
to manage the complex human interactions that remain.
Consider slavery. It arguably lowers the cost of human
interaction by diminishing the number of people who are entitled to
make choices. With fewer people to deal with, the costs of
interactions go down. Owners need not obtain information from
slaves about their preferences because their preferences do not count.
Slaves themselves have few choices to make; they do what they are
told. We could drastically reduce the number of property owners by
enslaving three-quarters of the population. Of course, this places
management costs on the slaveowners, but those costs are offset by
the fact that the owners do not have to negotiate with their slaves
over the terms of employment; they can simply order them around. If
the slaves resist, they can control them by force. Perhaps human
desires are less satisfied in the aggregate in such a system because a
majority of people are stifled in their ability to live their lives on their

59. Singer, Infrastructure of Democracy, supra note 55, at WFL11-3; Singer, supra note 43,
at 145, 148, 150.
60. For discussion of these laws and regulations, see infra Part III.
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own terms. And perhaps law enforcement costs go up if the slaves are
restless and resist orders. But the complexity of human interactions
has arguably been reduced (at least as a matter of defining the legal
rights that people have), and coordination problems have been solved
by giving dictatorial power to slaveowners and reducing the number
of people who have free will.
Of course, one can argue that the cost and difficulty of managing
slaves may outweigh the benefits in reduced information costs, and
one could construct an argument that demonstrates that slavery is
more costly than freedom in terms of coordination among persons or
in reducing the information needed for social interaction. My point
here is not to argue which of these interpretations is correct. My point
is that talking about slavery in terms of information costs is wholly
beside the point. To say that slavery is or is not an option because one
choice or the other minimizes information costs is to give an irrelevant
reason for the choice being made. We abolished slavery not because it
economized on information or because it made human interaction too
complex. We abolished it because it denies individuals the freedom
and equal dignity they deserve. We do not choose between slavery
and freedom on the grounds of complexity or efficiency or
information costs. We choose between them on the basis of
fundamental values about the inalienable right of each individual to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We minimize costs of social
interaction after we have made the decision to abolish slavery and to
promote equal human dignity, not before. Slavery is not a property
right that a democracy can legitimately recognize.
Slavery is sometimes thought to be an extreme example that has
no relevance to contemporary life. But consider what has occurred
within my own lifetime. The states that still recognized male
61
privileges in tenancies by the entirety abolished them. The separate
property states adopted equitable distribution statutes that treat
62
women as equal partners with men in marriage. We abolished racial
segregation and disability discrimination, protected women from
sexual harassment in the workplace, and allowed gay and lesbian
63
parents to adopt children.
61. SINGER, supra note 33, § 8.2.3, at 356–57.
62. Id. § 9.3.1, at 394–96.
63. Id. § 2.6, at 45–77. See generally William E. Adams, Jr., Whose Family Is It Anyway?
The Continuing Struggle for Lesbians and Gay Men Seeking To Adopt Children, 30 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 579 (1996) (analyzing shifting legal rules about gay and lesbian adoption of children);
Christopher Massaro, Note, The Role of Workplace Culture Evidence in Hostile Workplace
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For contemporary examples, consider same-sex marriage and
subprime mortgages. Same-sex marriage concerns the rights of
individuals to participate in a particular property arrangement. In
many states, the question is not just what to call the arrangement
(marriage, civil union, or contract) but whether the same-sex couple
can take on the rights and obligations associated with marriage at all.
As for subprime mortgages, we are engaged in a continuing debate
about whether or not they should be prohibited or regulated. We are
debating whether to forgive principal payments on underwater
mortgages so we can get the economy moving again. Should we “let
the market take care of it,” or should laws be changed to prevent
subprime mortgages from ruining families and national economies in
the future? Should we apply or amend consumer protection laws to
prohibit granting mortgages to people who are not likely to be able to
pay them back? Should we rewrite mortgage contracts to reflect
current market values? Should we adopt new banking and mortgage
regulations to prevent this problem from recurring? Should
64
mortgages be dischargeable in bankruptcy? These issues implicate
not only efficiency concerns, but also questions about what kinds of
contracts are so unfair or deceptive that they are the moral equivalent
of picking the consumer’s pocket, as well as questions about what
protections should be in place to enable people who are down on
their luck to recover and go on with their lives. These are not just
issues of imperfect information; they are normative questions about
what conduct promotes (and infringes on) human dignity.
Smith wrongly assumes that those of us who focus on the values
promoted by property law cannot see any value in a modular
approach to property. He suggests that we want every case to be
treated as if our goal were to enact our most fundamental values and
that we see no advantage in creating baselines, presumptions, and
65
bundled rights. Yet none of the modern proponents of a valuesEnvironment Sexual Harassment Litigation: Does Title VII Mean New Management or Just
Business as Usual?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 349 (2002) (exploring ways to prove a hostile
environment).
64. See generally Joseph William Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, or
Subprime Mortgage Conundrums and How To Fix Them, 46 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2390097 (discussing the
complexity of the subprime mortgage market and the legal choices needed to be made to
determine how to best regulate it).
65. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1717 (arguing that “[l]egal realists and their successors
object to delineation strategies that are not fully congruent with [the basic] purposes” of
property law).
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based approach to property law has actually argued against the idea
that property law forms part of the structure of society; nor has
anyone argued that we can live with a property system that has no
doctrine, no rules, no modules, no presumptions, and that we can
replace all that with direct consideration of values like virtue and
66
equality in every case. There are moral theorists who are
67
particularists who eschew all generalizations. Yet few legal realists
pursued that path; Hohfeld and legal realists like Karl Llewellyn
argued for the exercise of judgment in the interpretation of doctrine,
68
but not its abolition. And Professor Thomas Grey argued against an
inherent objective, value-free logic to property rights, but he did not
argue that there were no reasons to be in favor of particular bundles
69
of rights.
I do not know anyone who thinks that we would be better off if
we had no legal doctrine at all and just treated each property case as
one of first impression. I also do not know anyone who thinks that it
is not important to develop property rights that are workable,
transparent, and suited to the satisfaction of legitimate human
preferences, desires, and values. Nor have progressive property

66. Neither Professor Gregory Alexander nor Professor Eduardo Peñalver, for example,
argues that property law doctrine should be discarded and that every case should be treated as if
it were a case of first impression. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 752 (2009) (arguing for the “social-obligation
norm” theory to fill the gap in American property law); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 821, 888 (2009) (arguing for an introduction of “virtue ethics” in property law
but also noting that economic considerations are still important).
67. E.g., MARK TIMMONS, MORAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 245–66 (2002); Robert
Audi, Ethical Generality and Moral Judgment, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN MORAL
THEORY 285, 285–304 (James Dreier ed., 2006); Mark Norris Lance & Margaret Olivia Little,
Defending Moral Particularism, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN MORAL THEORY, supra, at
305, 305–21.
68. See Hohfeld, supra note 8, at 36 (arguing that whether a right exists is a matter of
“policy” that should be considered “on its merits”); K.N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal,
and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1359–67 (1940)
(exploring the complexity of normative generalization and its relation to the “stuff” of law); see
also HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING
PRIVATE LAW THEORY 1 (2013) (reinterpreting legal realism as focusing on several core
tensions that need resolution through considered judgment); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The
Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 25 GA. B.J. 127, 141
(1962) (arguing that intuition plays a crucial role in judicial decisionmaking but not arguing that
it is all that matters); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 471–72
(1988) (book review) (arguing that most legal realists see both precedent and legal reasoning as
a substantial constraint on judicial decisionmaking).
69. See generally Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS
XXII (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980).
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theorists like myself argued that we should not use our values to
structure property in ways that allocate presumptive control rights
and presumptive packages of entitlements. What we have argued is
that the structure, shape, and definition of the bundled rights in the
property law system must reflect our considered judgments about the
70
legitimate contours of the social order. We have also argued that
presumptive property rights cannot tell us what to do in hard cases;
when a plausible argument can be made that a property right should
be limited or narrowed to protect competing values, we have no
alternative but to give reasons why the case should or should not be
71
distinguished. All this requires interpretive strategies that use
methods of analysis that go beyond the calculation of the best way to
lower the cost of coordination among independent actors. In the first
instance, it requires placing some types of property arrangements off
the table. Some modules cannot be recognized by the law of a free
and democratic society no matter how well they reduce the
complexity of human interaction.
B. How Many Owners are Consistent with Democracy?
The Hawaiian island of Lanai is inhabited by only 3,135 people
72
on 141 square miles. Ninety-eight percent of the land is owned by
73
one man, Larry Ellison, the cofounder of Oracle Corporation.
Originally owned by Native Hawaiians, by the 1870s most of the land
74
had passed to a rancher named Walter Gibson. In 1922, James Dole,
president of what became the Dole Food Company, bought the island
75
and turned it into a huge pineapple plantation. In the 1980s Dole
moved its operations overseas and converted the land use from
76
agriculture to tourism. In 1985, the island’s ownership passed to
77
Dole’s parent company, controlled by billionaire David Murdock.

70. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 49.
71. Singer, supra note 6, at 1426.
72. Adam Nagourney, Tiny Hawaiian Island Will See if New Owner Tilts at Windmills, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at A1.
73. Id.
74. Kathleen Pender, So What Did Ellison Buy in His Hawaiian Island?, S.F. CHRON., June
27, 2012, at D1.
75. Richard A. Hawkins, James D. Dole and the 1932 Failure of the Hawaiian Pineapple
Company, 41 HAW. J. HIST. 149, 149–50 (2007); Pender, supra note 74.
76. Nagourney, supra note 72.
77. Id.; Pender, supra note 74; Gary A. Warner, Oracle’s Billionaire CEO Purchases
Hawaiian Island of Lanai, VANCOUVER SUN, July 17, 2012, at B8.
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Murdock sold the island to Ellison in 2012, retaining the right to
construct a field of forty-five-story wind turbines over a quarter of the
78
island. Because the tourist economy is limited by the difficulties of
getting to the island, as well as harmed by the recent economic
downturn following the subprime crisis, this development could form
the backbone of a more robust local economy, or it could ruin the
79
island’s wild beauty—or both. The plan has sharply divided residents
who are also anxious to know how the new development will affect
80
their island.
Why tell this story? First, the most striking thing to an American
is the incongruous fact that all the land on the island is owned by one
person. The American conception of democracy makes us wince at
this. It is reminiscent of the feudal system under William the
Conqueror, who reserved the right to take back the land from his
81
lords if they did not do as he wished. When the Illinois Supreme
Court considered the fact that Pullman’s Palace–Car Company was
the sole owner of the entire town of Pullman, Illinois, it interpreted
82
state law to force the company to sell much of the land. The court
explained that limiting ownership to one company is “incompatible
83
with the theory and spirit of our institutions.” Recall that in colonial
times, King Charles II gave New Jersey to two lords who sought to
install a feudal regime only to face stalwart resistance from the
84
settlers who insisted on freedom from control by a feudal lord. Their
resistance led to the modern American system of wide dispersal of
property ownership rather than allowing it to be concentrated in the
85
hands of a small aristocracy. They also helped establish our tradition
of “freehold” property that confers wide powers on owners to control
their own land and their own lives rather than being subject to the
86
whim of an absentee lord.
Is there or is there not something untoward or wrong about
having one owner of the entire island of Lanai? The idea of
minimizing information costs of human interaction does not help us
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Nagourney, supra note 72.
Id.
Id.
See Singer, Infrastructure of Democracy, supra note 55, at WFL11-1 to -2.
People v. Pullman’s Palace–Car Co., 51 N.E. 664, 668, 677–78 (Ill. 1898).
Id. at 674.
Singer, Infrastructure of Democracy, supra note 55, at WFL11-5.
See id. at WFL11-5 to -6.
Id.
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answer this question. In one sense, we can argue that reducing
ownership to one minimizes information costs enormously. If you
want to use any of the land on Lanai, you have to ask Ellison. The
problems of human coordination have been solved; he decides
whether you can live on the island, where you can live, and what you
can do there. On the other hand, although ownership by one person
gives him a great deal of certainty, it creates a great deal of
uncertainty to the nonowners who are subject to the owner’s whim.
Whether they can or cannot do what they want depends on what
Ellison decides. Whether they can even live on the island depends on
what he thinks of them. If our goal is to minimize the costs of
information for each individual, we need to give each person some
basis for making plans; that suggests ensuring that each person has
some property she is entitled to use as she pleases. How many land
owners do there need to be for this to be true? What rights do tenants
and nonowners need to have so that they have some opportunity to
become owners or so that they have sufficient freedom to make their
own choices about how to live? If each person is entitled to equal
protection of the law, and if that means that we need to promote
equal opportunity, what property law architecture is necessary to
achieve that set of values? How many owners is enough? What is the
appropriate balance of rights held in fee simple versus leasehold
versus condominium status? Would it promote or violate property
rights to take the land from Ellison and redistribute it to the
thousands of islanders?
Americans do not all agree about the number of owners or the
mix of property forms that comports with our commitment to treating
each person as entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Nor do we all agree about the contours of the property system that
shape our choices. We have abolished feudalism, but we still have
islands owned by one person, and the fact that Americans deeply
value the ideal of dispersed property ownership does not mean that
inequality is not an issue for us today. On the contrary, the Occupy
movement placed on the national agenda the increasing inequality of
87
wealth and income over the last thirty years. The value choices here
are front and center. Though some argue that we should desist from

87. Cf. DONALD L. BARLETT & JAMES B. STEELE, THE BETRAYAL OF THE AMERICAN
DREAM 10–11 (2012); PETER EDELMAN, SO RICH, SO POOR: WHY IT’S SO HARD TO END
POVERTY IN AMERICA 32–34 (2012); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW
TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 246–47 (2012).
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“class warfare” and that it is wrong for people to be “envious” of
those who are successful, others argue that inequality not only harms
the economy but also contradicts the American ideal of equal
88
opportunity.
When slavery was abolished, decisions needed to be made about
89
who would own the plantations upon which the slaves worked. A
decision could have been made to transfer ownership to the former
slaves either in individual lots or in a corporate or collective form.
The slaveowners who rebelled against the United States could have
forfeited their property rights in the land. None of these things
happened. The rebels who pledged loyalty to the United States got to
keep their lands, and over time, less and less was done to help the
90
former slaves. They received neither back wages nor land of their
91
own. What should have been done?
Economizing on information costs tells us little or nothing about
what to do here. Information costs are low whether we give the
plantation to the former slaveowner or the former slaves. Perhaps
they are lower if we give the land to the former slaveowner because
then we have one owner rather than many. As I have noted, we could
lower information costs about who controls property even further by
giving all the land there is to one person—as actually occurred when
William conquered England and was crowned king on Christmas day
92
in 1066. Of course, giving one person ownership of all the land
increases some transaction costs; if everyone in the land wants access
to it, then the king has a lot of meetings to take, and the costs of
managing all those requests will be quite burdensome on him and on
everyone else who is, in the meantime, excluded from the things they
88. See STIGLITZ, supra note 87, at 17 (“Belief in America’s essential fairness, that we live
in a land of equal opportunity, helps bind us together.”).
89. See Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916, 1938–40
(1987) (describing ambivalence about how to protect former slaves and their property rights in
the wake of the Civil War).
90. See id. at 1939–45 (describing how plans for federal guardianship and land
redistribution for former slaves yielded to the abandonment of redistribution plans in favor of
leaving lands to Confederate owners).
91. See Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master’s Tools, from the Bottom Up: Responses to
African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA.
L. REV. 863, 890–91 (1993) (describing the failure of Reconstruction land-redistribution and
reparation efforts).
92. MARC MORRIS, THE NORMAN CONQUEST 166, 196, 198 (2012). King William
immediately allowed property rights to become more complex by creating a feudal system based
on specific personal relationships and obligations. See id. at 202 (describing the distribution of
King William’s enemies’ lands after he became England’s new ruler).
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need. So perhaps there is an efficient balance between information
costs and transaction or management costs. The point, however, is
that costs of managing the system are not the only thing we care
about. We are interested in the distribution of property not only
because we care about satisfying our preferences at the lowest
possible cost but also because we care about how many people’s
preferences get satisfied. More than that, we care about whether we
are living in a democratic or a feudal society, whether we will have
freedom or servitude, and whether we will have equal status before
the law or titles of nobility.
Consider the continuing dilemmas in South Africa, where the
antiapartheid constitution both granted a fair amount of protection to
existing property owners and authorized land reform and common
law development needed to move from an apartheid society to a free
93
and democratic one. Continuing choices need to be made that reflect
not only pragmatic economic and political needs and realities but also
fundamental value choices. The one thing that cannot be assumed is
that all “established property rights” must be protected; that would
be a recipe for servitude. Recall the idea that property makes liberty
possible. As Professor Jeremy Waldron has explained, everything that
is done must be done somewhere, and one cannot do anything unless
94
one has a place to do it. Virginia Woolf famously argued that women
95
could not write novels until they had a room of their own. If the
system of property law does not make it realistically possible for each
person to become an owner of the property needed for a full human
life, then we have deprived individuals of the freedom that was the
reason for creating property rights in the first place. In a society that
has chosen to reject apartheid as a way of life, property rights must
not only be redistributed but also tailored to enable equal liberties to
96
emerge.
The question of how much inequality is appropriate cannot be
answered by quantitative or economic analysis alone; rather, it
implicates the meaning of the values of liberty and equality. It
engages choices about the contours of a free and democratic society.
93. See, e.g., A.J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS 1–26 (2009) (exploring the
dilemmas of property rights in a transformative society seeking to abolish apartheid).
94. Jeremy Waldron, Essay, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L. REV.
295, 296 (1991).
95. VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN 4 (Harvest ed. 1989) (1929).
96. See Joseph William Singer, Property and Equality: Public Accommodations and the
Constitution in South Africa and the United States, 12 S. AFR. J. PUB. L. 53, 54–55 (1997).
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Conservatives suggest that property redistribution is anathema
because property is the basis of liberty; on that view, taking property
inevitably takes liberty. But liberals argue that if property is necessary
for the exercise of liberty, then denying property ownership denies
the ability to exercise liberty; on that view redistribution may be
required to promote freedom. Determining whether our system
generates sufficient opportunities to acquire property (or the abilities
that property enables) implicates normative questions that can only
be answered by reference to analysis of the fundamental values of
freedom, equality, and democracy.
C. Who Can Own Property in a Democracy?
The Fourteenth Amendment ensures “equal protection of the
97
laws,” and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ensures that every citizen
shall have the same right to purchase and own property as is enjoyed
98
by white citizens. The Public Accommodations Law of 1964 ensures
equal access to certain public accommodations without regard to
99
race. The 1968 Fair Housing Act prohibits the creation of racial
covenants as well as racially discriminatory refusals to sell or rent or
100
mortgage property because of race, religion, or national origin. And
101
the case of Shelley v. Kraemer interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause to allow owners to create racially restrictive covenants but
102
denied them the power to enforce them in court. All these laws and
decisions have embodied an antiapartheid principle at the heart of
modern American property law; no one can be denied the
opportunity to acquire or enjoy property because of the color of their
103
skin. We tend to take these laws for granted in 2014, but the
abolition of racial restrictions on access to property occurred in my
lifetime. And although the married women’s property acts of the
nineteenth century ensured that married women could own and
104
control their own property, it was not until the 1960s that equitable
distribution statutes ensured women in separate property states a

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Id. at 13, 22.
See generally Singer, Anti-Apartheid Principle, supra note 55.
SINGER, supra note 33, § 9.2.2, at 392–93.
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share of the marital property accumulated during marriage upon
105
divorce.
The question of who is entitled to own property is not limited to
issues of discrimination. Consider the tenants who are evicted when
their landlords lose their properties to foreclosure after defaulting on
subprime mortgages. Should rent-paying tenants have any rights to
stay in their homes? The law has traditionally said no because tenants
are not owners and the new owners have the right to end periodic
106
tenancies upon giving requisite notice. But recall that homeowners
were also originally not owners when they borrowed money in
exchange for a mortgage on their property. Some states—like the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts—retain this old-fashioned system.
When you grant a mortgage to a bank in Massachusetts, the bank has
107
title to your property until you pay off the note. Similarly, states
that use deeds of trust rather than mortgages grant title to the
108
property to the trustee until the debt is paid. Despite the fact that
the borrower gave the property title to the lender in exchange for the
loan and the borrower then defaulted on the loan in violation of the
agreement, the equity courts in England intervened to protect the
rights of nonowners from strict foreclosure, allowing them to stay on
land they did not “own,” even though they had defaulted on their
109
obligations, as long as they paid off the debt in a reasonable time.
So too do statutes in most states, which give homeowners the right to
stay in their homes and avoid foreclosure if they can make up the
110
payments they have missed in a timely fashion. These protective
rights exist even though the mortgaged homeowners in states like
Massachusetts do not have title to their homes and even though they
have missed payments they solemnly promised to make.
Why then do not tenants who are paying the rent have the same
rights to stay in their homes after foreclosure, especially when the
new owner is a bank that has no interest in moving into the home

105. Id. § 9.3.1, at 394–95.
106. See id. § 10.5.4, at 467–68.
107. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the
Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 637, 665–66 (2013) (describing mortgagee
possession of land title in title-theory states); id. at 692 n.232 (citing United States Bank National
Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. 2011), for the proposition that mortgage transactions are
considered a sale and repurchase of land in title-theory states such as Massachusetts).
108. SINGER, supra note 33, § 11.5.1, at 561.
109. Id. at 557–58.
110. SINGER, supra note 33, § 10.4.4.1, at 456.
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itself? In the mortgage context, we deem the bank’s interest to be
only in the repayment of the debt with contractually agreed-upon
interest, whereas the homeowner’s interest is a personal attachment
to the home, deserving of solicitude regardless of what the contract
says. As long as the bank is made whole monetarily, mortgage law
gives the homeowner the right to stay in her home. Why are
residential tenants denied this right? Several jurisdictions have in fact
granted tenants the right to remain in their homes unless the landlord
can show a legitimate reason to evict them, such as the landlord’s
111
interest in moving into the property herself. Massachusetts recently
passed statutes that allow rent-paying tenants to continue to live in
their homes even after foreclosure if the property is bought at
112
foreclosure by the mortgagee-bank, as often happens. Under these
laws, only when the property is transferred to a third-party owner is
113
the tenant vulnerable to eviction.
Most states, however,
conceptualize tenants as nonowners who have no right to continue
living in their homes once the lease runs out, no matter how long they
114
have been living there.
Should tenants have a right to continue living in their homes
unless just cause can be shown to evict them? Should tenants be
treated as the “owners” of their leaseholds with landlords relegated to
a subordinate status as future interest holders who can kick out
tenants only if the landlords want to occupy the property as their
home? Should rent-paying tenants be empowered to stay in their
homes after foreclosure unless the new owner can demonstrate a
superior interest? Answering these questions requires us to choose
the kind of social life we want to have. It requires determining
whether there is a relevant distinction between defaulting
homeowners and rent-paying tenants. It requires a normative analysis
of the relevant interests, values, and rights at stake and the
justifiability of the expectations of the parties. It requires us to

111. E.g., D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (2001 & Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.1 to .3
(West 2000 & Supp. 2013); see also SINGER, supra note 33, § 10.5.4, at 468. New Hampshire also
limits eviction in certain circumstances. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 540:1-a, 540:2 (LexisNexis
2006 & Supp. 2013).
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186A, §§ 1–6 (2011).
113. See id. § 2 (“[A] foreclosing owner shall not evict a tenant except for just cause or
unless a binding purchase and sale agreement has been executed for a bona fide third party to
purchase the housing accommodation from a foreclosing owner.”).
114. See SINGER, supra note 33, § 10.5.4, at 467–68 (observing that landlords in states
without strict antieviction laws are “generally free to refuse to renew existing leaseholds”).

SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1316

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/20/2014 4:59 PM

[Vol. 63:1287

determine the value we place on staying in one’s home. All this
requires something deeper and more fundamental than an analysis of
cost minimization.
D. How Long Do Property Rights Last in a Democracy?
In college, I took an introductory economics course with
Professor Randall Bartlett. In one of the early classes, he asked us if
we were in favor of economic competition. Having been taught that
competition was a good thing, we all said yes. He looked at us and
said, “Really? Would you like it if you never knew, when you came to
class, whether or not there might be someone else already sitting in
your seat, ready, willing, and able to do a better job than you?” Well,
no that would be nerve-wracking, we all thought. That would be like
going home and finding someone else in your bed, as Doctor Zhivago
did when he came home to find dozens of people living in his
115
mansion. We all would like to know that we have a home to go
home to; we would all like to know we have a seat in the class—at
least until the final exams come around. Professor Bartlett did not put
it in these words, but as a property scholar, I know now that what we
valued was property. We wanted a stable basis of expectation, even if
that stability was temporary. We wanted a haven from the storm, time
to learn, time to take advantage of the opportunity that college was.
Of course, it is not a foregone conclusion that a property law
system should give us such peace of mind. I played violin in
orchestras when I was a teenager, and some of them were competitive
to get into. Auditions not only determined if you got into the
orchestra but also what your seat was. And more than that, at any
time, one of the violinists sitting behind you in the orchestra could
challenge you to an audition to see if they could take your seat from
you. You never knew, from day to day, whether someone would
challenge you, play better than you, and take your seat, demoting you
to a less prestigious perch. You might even be challenged by someone
in the junior orchestra—a challenge with the real potential for a
dramatic fall from grace. One could imagine an even more dramatic
competitive system that would allow anyone—even an outsider—to
compete at any moment for your seat in the orchestra. Nor is this a
far-fetched notion. Few Americans have job tenure; the American
system of at-will employment means that most people can be fired at

115. DOCTOR ZHIVAGO (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1965).

SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2/20/2014 4:59 PM

PROPERTY AS THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY

1317

any time for any (nondiscriminatory) reason. And recent changes in
the economy have turned many more of us into independent
contractors who have even less job security than the typical
employee.
Our property law system, on the other hand, does not usually
work this way. Usually our property cannot be taken away from us
just because someone else thinks they can use it better or need it
more. If you want to buy my house, you can approach me with an
offer, but I am entitled to refuse without giving you a reason. I do not
have to justify myself to you. In particular, I do not have to prove I
can use the property better and more efficiently than you or that I
value it more than you do. And you cannot force me to sell my
property to you no matter how badly you want it or how valuable the
use you want to put it to. Perhaps one could argue that giving me the
power to exclude others from my property and to decide when, if
ever, to relinquish my rights minimizes the costs of figuring out what
can done with the property. It certainly seems as if that would be the
case, at least as compared with allowing judges to make case-by-case
determinations of who is the best user of the land. But the point I
want to make is that this choice is not only a choice about cost
minimization; it is a value choice among forms of social life. Do we
want to organize things so you have a seat in the class with the right
to graduate if you follow the rules and do the work successfully, or
would we rather treat you like a day laborer or an independent
contractor who has to prove yourself from moment to moment,
constantly at risk of losing your spot in a class?
Nor is the possibility of conditional property entirely foreign to
American law. In fact, multiple legal regimes embrace conditional
property ownership. Recall that some federal lands sold by the
United States through the nineteenth-century homestead laws were
conditioned on the buyer building a home on the land and working
116
it. Congress decided that the land was better used by settlers than
by speculators, and so Congress conditioned ownership on that
117
basis. The relative hardship doctrine allows you to force me to sell
my land to you if you build a structure that encroaches on my
property when you thought in good faith that that property belonged

116. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 416 (2d ed. 1985)
(describing the Homestead Act of 1862).
117. The Homestead Act of 1862 made title conditional on the owner improving the land.
Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 392, 392 (repealed 1976).
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to you and I failed to do anything to stop you from building. You
can take my property by adverse possession if you occupy it for a long
119
time without my permission. Sometimes the courts will even force
you to sell me the benefit of a covenant you own if it interferes with
120
the best and highest use of my property. The state of Hawaii forced
landowners on the island of Oahu to sell their property to their
tenants because the distribution of property was so unequal that it
121
deprived almost everyone of the chance of becoming an owner. And
remember that the fair use exception to copyright law prevents you
from interfering with my freedom to comment on your intellectual
122
property.
In all these cases, lawmakers faced a choice between property
and competition, between stability and change, between quiet
enjoyment and new development. How much stability do we want
and how much competition do we want? How much power should
owners have to stop others from impinging on the value of their
property? What obligations do owners have to the community and
their neighbors? Property law systems must take positions on how
much stability and how much competition to foster. Indeed, at the
time of the American Revolution, it might well have been thought to
be a violation of property rights for someone to open a rival store in a
123
small town. It took a decision of the Supreme Court in the Charles
124
River Bridge case to cement the idea in American law that there
125
was no property right to be free from ordinary competition. It took
a decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois to force the Pullman
Company to sell its property in Pullman, Illinois on the grounds that

118. SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.4.1, at 41–42.
119. Id. § 4.2, at 143–55.
120. See, e.g., Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 913–14 (Mass. 1974) (holding that
enforcement of restrictions preventing construction of an apartment hotel complex would “tend
to impede reasonable use of the land for purposes for which it is most suitable” and require
owners of nearby lots to accept damages).
121. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232–33, 245 (1984).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
123. Cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American
Law, 1780–1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248, 248 (1973) (describing the transformation from a static
conception of property based on protecting established uses to a dynamic one that viewed
competition as desirable even if it resulted in harm to previously established property rights).
124. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
125. See generally STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE
CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971).
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company towns were contrary to the “spirit of our institutions.”
Choosing how many owners is enough and how much stability to
protect are not only choices about the costs of determining how to use
property and who gets to decide that. Rather, they are also choices
about the nature of social and political life—choices that depend on
normative reasoning about what it means to protect the freedom of
individuals, to treat each person with equal concern and respect, and
to live in a free and democratic society.
E. What Obligations Do Owners Have in a Democracy?
To the chagrin of the mayor, for many years there has been a
127
gaping hole in downtown Boston. Filene’s Department Store closed,
and the building was purchased by an owner who razed the
128
building. Then the subprime crisis struck, and the new owner either
129
could not or would not redevelop the property. This left an ugly,
empty lot in the midst of the downtown area—an eyesore that
remained for several years, affecting the entire environment of the
130
downtown area. The hole in the ground affected the surrounding
area by depriving the neighbors and the community as a whole of the
benefits of the business and housing that could have been profitably
constructed on the property. The mayor and other city officials did
whatever they could to convince the owner to develop the property,
131
to no avail. The most valuable use of the property to the owner may
have been to leave it vacant and wait for the market value of the
property to appreciate or for the economy to recover from the Great
Recession; development may also have been contingent on banks
recovering from the subprime debacle so that they would be willing to
loan the money necessary for the development. Perhaps the city could
have taken the property by eminent domain and transferred it to an
owner who would develop it rather than wait for market conditions to

126. People v. Pullman’s Palace–Car Co., 51 N.E. 664, 674 (Ill. 1898).
127. Thomas Grillo, Stalled Filene’s Project Poised for Rebirth, BBJ REAL EST. DAILY (June
12, 2012, 9:32 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/real_estate/2012/06/filenes-projectpoised-to-be-reborn.html.
128. Abby Goodnough, A Downtown Hub Is Missed, and a Replacement Is Stalled, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2010, at A20.
129. Greg Turner, From Basement to Tower: Condos, Shops Eyed for Downtown Crossing,
BOS. HERALD, June 12, 2012, at 4.
130. Jenn Abelson, Bostonians Dream Big About a Reborn Downtown Crossing, BOS.
GLOBE, Feb. 19, 2012, at G1; Turner, supra note 129.
131. Paul McMorrow, The Art of the Deal, Boston-Style, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2012, at A13.

SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

1320

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/20/2014 4:59 PM

[Vol. 63:1287

132

improve. Of course, this would raise all the flags stirred up by the
133
Kelo v. City of New London decision. Taking the property would be
unconstitutional in many states despite the externalities of the empty
134
lot, whereas in other states the taking would only be lawful if an
135
empty lot constitutes a form of “blight.” Does the owner have the
right to leave the lot empty or not when it could be profitably
developed? Does the city have the power to take the property by
eminent domain to transfer it to an owner who will develop it?
Professor Henry Smith is quite right that as a structural matter,
we start from the presumption that there is an owner with the right to
136
exclude others and the power to use (or not to use) the property.
He is also right that we sometimes address this issue through
137
“governance” strategies by equitable rules. Such rules may require
the property to be developed or transferred, or they may force the
property to be redistributed from a recalcitrant owner to one who will
develop the property in a manner consistent with the public interest.
But answering the question of whether the owner has any obligations
not to leave an empty lot in the downtown area during a recession is
not one that can be answered only by reference to the structural logic
of property, the economics of information costs, or the costs and
benefits of particularized decisionmaking.
The problem here is not information costs. If you are not the
owner and you want something to happen on the empty lot, talk to
the owner. If you are the owner, you are free to use or not to use the
property and you do not have to explain yourself to anyone—even
the mayor. Information costs are low here. The problem implicated is
a normative question about whether the owner was legitimately

132. Indeed, Mayor Thomas M. Menino threatened to seize the site by eminent domain,
before ultimately providing tax credits to Millennium Partners, which bought the property in
April 2013. Thomas Grillo, Menino Defends Filene’s Tax Credits for Millennium Partners, BBJ
REAL EST. DAILY (Sept. 9, 2013, 3:22 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/real_estate/2013/
09/menino-defends-filenes-tax-credits.html.
133. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
134. See id. at 489 (“[M]any States already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter
than the federal baseline.”).
135. For example, in California, cities may only take land deemed “blighted” for economic
development purposes. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33037 (West 2010).
136. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1693–94 (arguing that “[t]here is no interest in exclusion per
se,” but that “exclusion strategies, including the right to exclude, serve the interest in use,” and
that “property defines things using an exclusion strategy of ‘keep off’ or ‘don’t touch’ and then
enriches the system of domains of owner control with interfaces using governance strategies”).
137. Id. at 1715.
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exercising his property rights or whether he was unjustifiably
imposing harms on the community by his inaction. Was this an
instance of a legitimate exercise of an owner’s rights, or was this an
instance of an owner imposing negative externalities on everyone else
in the city, jeopardizing their property rights and their livelihoods?
The question was not how to structure property rights to reduce the
complexity of human interaction; the question was whether the owner
had the right to decide by himself to create a crater in the heart of the
downtown area and stubbornly keep it there for years, or conversely,
whether the city had the power to interfere with the owner’s freedom
to choose what, if anything, to do with his own property. Was this a
case of an individual freely and rationally exercising his legitimate
property rights, or was it a case of an individual acting to batter and
damage the property rights of others?
Smith correctly explains that property law organizes land in a
way that assigns ownership of bundled rights to individuals or
corporations and then creates presumptions that grant those owners
138
presumptive control of the property. He is also right that we limit
the rights of owners in particular classes of cases when the exercise of
property rights harms the rights of others or undermines the social
139
network. But Smith wrongly concludes from this that governance
140
strategies represent a gloss on a core exclusion strategy. The
question of whether an owner has the right to be free from
expropriation of his property for transfer to others is not just a matter
141
of “singl[ing] out” particular cases for “special treatment.” It
embodies fundamental normative choices about the powers that go
along with ownership in a free and democratic society. It asks us to
address the constitutional question of whether property can be taken
from one owner for transfer to another.
Libertarians who adopt Professor Robert Nozick’s perspective
would probably argue that owners should not have to sacrifice their
property for the good of the community when the community wants

138. See id. at 1709–13 (discussing control and arguing that “the basic features of property
are not sticks, but automatic, presumptive features of an exclusionary modular strategy”).
139. See id. at 1713–16 (discussing equitable safety valves in the context of nuisance law and
exclusion strategies).
140. See id. at 1710 (“[G]overnance strategies—implemented by nuisance law, covenants,
and regulations—take exclusion as a platform and modify its features when it is important to do
so.”).
141. See id. at 1710 (“At some cost, specific people in the large and indefinite set of in rem
duty bearers can be singled out for special treatment.”).
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to transfer the property from A to B. If the city wants the property
badly enough, it should offer the owner enough to induce him to sell;
if he refuses, then he is not only within his rights but also values the
property more than others do. Of course, the problem is more
complicated than this. Even Nozick worried about the case of the sole
owner, arguing that someone who comes to own the only water hole
in the desert should have obligations to share the water with everyone
143
else. Ownership, with the attendant right to exclude others, confers
power on the owner—power to deny other people things they need to
144
live. Granting the owner veto power over the decision whether to
keep an empty lot in the middle of Boston’s Downtown Crossing
arguably violates democratic norms by giving despotic power over the
community to a single individual. This situation approaches lordship.
Our property norms coexist with democracy as a form of political
governance; problems can arise if property rights allow the few to
impose their will on the many.
Liberals would similarly debate the appropriate resolution of this
problem. Liberals worry that majorities are likely to deprive
powerless working class or poor homeowners of their homes to
transfer them to large corporations or that majorities may decide to
gentrify a community and displace and disperse a minority enclave. If
only blighted property can be taken and redistributed, then the poor
are vulnerable to having their property taken, but the rich are not.
How is this compatible with equal protection of the law? On the other
hand, one could classify the vacant lot as blighted because it impacts
the local economy and is a visual and environmental blot on the
center of commerce. Owners have no right to use their property to
harm the property rights of others. They have no right to impose their
will on the community. We live, after all, in a free and democratic
society, and we do not abide lords who impose their will on the rest of

142. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 160–65, 180 (1974) (“By what
process could such a transfer among two persons give rise to a legitimate claim of distributive
justice on a portion of what was transferred, by a third party who had no claim of justice on any
holding of the others before the transfer?”).
143. See id. at 180.
144. See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER
89–90 (2003) (discussing the right to exclude and the power it confers in cases such as those
involving valuable commodities); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Property: A Special Right, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1996) (explaining how granting a property right to one
person confers power over others by “necessarily and inevitably den[ying] the same right to
others”); cf. Waldron, supra note 94, at 299–301 (“As far as being on private property is
concerned . . . the homeless person is utterly and at all times at the mercy of others.”).
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us. As with the libertarian debate, liberals need to come to terms with
the conflicting interests and values at stake here, including the
property interests of the owner and of the neighbors who have an
interest in a vibrant downtown area where they can congregate, do
business, and find pleasure.
So is the owner here exercising his legitimate property rights, or
is he imposing harm on the community? Does he have the right to put
his own interests above those of the community, or does he have an
obligation either to develop his property or submit to a taking by
eminent domain for transfer to someone who will develop it? These
questions require normative choices among conflicting values; they
also require us to interpret the meaning of those values. Would it
deprive the owner of equal protection of the law to take his property
because we think others could use it better, or does the owner’s
refusal to develop the property constitute an inegalitarian exercise of
power that deprives other owners of the value of their property?
Would a taking by eminent domain violate equality norms or
promote them? Would it deprive the owner of the liberty to use his
property as he wishes, or would it protect the quiet enjoyment of
neighboring property owners by abating a nuisance? These questions
implicate not only common law doctrines but also constitutional
norms. They represent not just special treatment of particular cases,
but choices of fundamental structural norms and a decision about our
way of life. They represent choices about the relation between rights
and power.
In a free and democratic society, owners have rights, but they
also have obligations. Restaurants and shops cannot exclude patrons
145
on the basis of their race or religion.
Nor can public
accommodations refuse to make reasonable accommodations to
146
make their services available to persons with disabilities. Owners
are not free to ignore longstanding occupation of their property if
they want to protect themselves from loss of their property by
147
adverse possession. Owners cannot vote to pass zoning laws that
unduly inhibit the ability of religious institutions to operate in their
148
communities. Landlords cannot fail to provide tenants with heat or

145.
146.
147.
148.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000a-6 (2006); SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.6.1, at 45–48.
SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.6.3, at 65–68.
Id. § 4.1, at 140–43.
Id. § 13.7.1.3, at 662–64.
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hot water. Owners are not free to interfere with the quiet enjoyment
150
of neighboring owners, nor are they free to saddle buyers with
151
covenants that unreasonably impede the alienability of land.
Owners are not free to sell property without reducing the transaction
152
to writing and recording the documents in the registry of deeds. Nor
are they free to build without complying with local building and
153
construction codes. The number of obligations the law imposes on
owners is far too numerous to mention. And determining what
obligations owners have requires attention to our deepest norms and
values.
Property law is designed to spread freedom, opportunity,
security, and wealth, but it is also designed to prevent owners from
inflicting harm on others and from acting in a manner that is
incompatible with norms of propriety. Condominium associations, for
example, are empowered to pass reasonable rules governing the use
of units as well as common areas, and condominium owners are
154
subject to those rules. But the law places limits on the kinds of rules
that can be passed. Those that interfere too much with individual
freedoms will be deemed outside the lawful authority of the
association. For example, rules that prevent owners from displaying
religious symbols on their doors may be prohibited because they
violate fair-housing laws that protect religious minorities from being
155
excluded from housing. The issues that can come up in this context
and others like it are almost limitless. Can condominium associations
prohibit smoking entirely both in common areas and inside units?
Can they prevent owners from posting signs indicating support for
political candidates? Can universities prohibit students from posting
political signs on their dorm windows? The Confederate flag? The
Swastika? Can shopping centers exclude patrons wearing “Peace on
Earth” t-shirts? Obama t-shirts? Defining the scope of property rights
means defining the rights and obligations of persons in a free and
democratic society.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. § 10.6.3, at 472–76.
Id. § 3.1, at 98–100.
Id. § 6.7.2, at 278–83.
Id. § 11.3.2, at 506–08.
Id. § 13.6.1, at 652–53.
Id. § 8.5, at 375–76.
Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 772–73 (7th Cir. 2009).
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III. PROPERTY, POLITICS, AND MORALITY
Suppose we want to think about the basic structure of property
law. Instead of turning to economics, what would happen if we start
by looking to political and moral theory instead? What would this tell
us about the basic structure of property law? It would require us,
before we do anything else, to choose among political regimes, such
as dictatorship, monarchy, aristocracy, feudalism, communism,
tribalism, corporatism, and democracy, among others. We would first
have to acknowledge basic values that the system should reflect.
Property scholars sometimes forget to do this because we operate
within a normative and political framework that we take for granted;
we live in a democracy, and that means we have made a commitment
to a certain type of polity. At the same time, we have multiple and
conflicting interpretations of the basic values that a democracy should
uphold.
Hard as it may be to articulate what democracy means, we can
get some traction by looking to the things democracies reject. If we
look to our own history as colonies of Great Britain and our own
experience with the institution of slavery, it becomes evident that we
have rejected monarchy, feudalism, established religion, and slavery
as forms of social life and as political systems. This also means we
reject those ways of organizing control over property. Though all this
may seem obvious, it actually exacts substantial constraining force on
us in defining the type of property law system that is compatible with
our way of life. What does it mean for us today that we reject
monarchy, established religion, feudalism, and slavery? What are the
basic values of free and democratic societies? Arguably the most
important values we hold are liberty, equality, and government of the
people, by the people, and for the people.
We start before all else from the premise that each human being
156
157
is equal. We reject the idea of unequal status. We have no lords in
America. Indeed, the Constitution contains a Nobility Clause that
158
prohibits Congress from granting any title of nobility. We do not
need to look to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to find an
equality principle at the heart of the Constitution. Just as we have no

156. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
158. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States . . . .”);
see also id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from “grant[ing] any Title of Nobility”).
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lords, we have no masters. The Nobility Clause, the Fourteenth
160
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause,
the Thirteenth
161
and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s abolition of slavery,
162
Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law all teach a single
lesson. Each person is entitled to equal concern and respect. Part of
what that means is that each person is equally entitled to freely
determine her own destiny. We, each of us, have rights to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. No one can tell us what path we should
take, what job we must have, where we must live, or how we must
spend our days. We have individual liberty to decide how to live our
lives. We are free to adopt and live by the religious and moral values
that come to us or that we have chosen. And because we believe that
each human being is “created equal,” we are not free to deny others
the liberties we demand for ourselves.
Of course, as Professor Henry Smith argues, this poses a
163
coordination problem. But it also poses both a moral problem and a
political problem. How can the free actions of each be made
consistent with the free actions of all? This is the basic problem moral
and political theorists analyze. Equal freedom can be achieved only if
freedom of action is limited to ensure that one person’s actions do not
impair the legitimate rights of others to equal freedom. And if
Professors Jeremy Waldron and Laura Underkuffler are right that we
164
are only free to act if we have somewhere to engage in the action,
then freedom requires property to be distributed in a manner that
gives each and every person a place where she is entitled to be and
sufficient resources so that she is able to sustain life and to pursue
happiness. If we adopt democracy as a political system, we will want
to give individuals freedom to adopt and live by their own moral
codes as long as those codes are consistent with the ability of others
to live by their moral codes. We need both space for moral principles
and space for political principles that enable people with differing
religious and moral views to coexist together. We differentiate moral
reasoning from public or political reasoning to some extent, at least if
we assume that we are going to live in a society with plural

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
Id. amend. XIII, § 1.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See supra note 144.
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“comprehensive philosophical moral doctrines” as Professor John
165
Rawls called them. We need reasons for laws that could be
acceptable to persons with very different world views, values,
religious creeds, and perspectives.
What this means is that we face more than a coordination
problem; we face the problem of interpreting the values of liberty,
equality, and democracy and resolving conflicts that may arise among
them. Though the values of liberty and equality may appear to be
“self-evident,” their interpretation is not. I may be free to choose my
friends on the basis of race, but I am not entitled to choose my
customers or tenants on that basis; owners of residences may choose
whom to invite to dinner on any basis they like, including a racist one,
but owners of restaurants may not engage in similarly discriminatory
choices in determining whom they allow into their establishments. I
may be free, with others, to create a homeowners’ association, but our
collective powers must be limited to ensure that the majority of
owners do not oppress the minority or interfere unduly with the
freedom of each owner to control her own unit so that she can have a
place to live her life in peace.
In addition to basic values of liberty and equality, we believe in
democratic, representative government with elected officials
empowered to pass laws and regulations that enable us to live
together in peace and that promote the common welfare. That means
that we want to be governed by representatives chosen by the people
through elections and not experts chosen by the American Economic
Association or the American Philosophical Association. It means we
do not have an established church. This does not mean we do not see
a place for experts or religion; it means they are not the sole
determinants of social values or the norms that underlie and justify
our laws. Experts have expertise in particular subject matter areas,
but they are not the last word on what the laws should be. Religions
are the source of many of our deepest values, but we do not hand
government over to religious institutions. Democracies believe in selfgovernment, and that means that the people, in some way, adopt our
own laws, including rules governing the distribution and exercise of
property rights. We want to be able to use our property as we wish,
but we also want to be able to collectively choose laws that protect
our property rights from things our neighbors might do next door.
165. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT § 5.2, at 14 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001).
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Legitimate zoning laws do not take away our property rights; they
ensure that our property rights are protected. They may limit the
freedom of individual owners to do what they wish, but they express
the freedom of the majority to limit property uses to ensure that we
can have quiet enjoyment of our own property in a municipal
environment that is diverse, sensible, and attractive.
Choosing to live in a free and democratic society that treats each
person with equal concern and respect has enormous consequences
for the basic structure of property law. But what those consequences
are differs depending on one’s normative framework. As I have
noted, the ideals of equality, liberty, and democracy are not selfdefining. They require interpretation of our most fundamental values.
A libertarian framework such as that presented by Nozick will
interpret these basic values far differently than a liberal framework
166
that uses the approach of Rawls. At the same time, it is crucial to
understand that there is considerable and perhaps surprising overlap
between the libertarian and liberal perspectives—far more so than
one would think if one focused on the polarized political rhetoric in
the United States. At the very least, democracies require (1) that
there be many owners, (2) that opportunities to acquire the property
needed for a full human life are universally (and readily) available,
and (3) that the scope of the powers granted to owners must be
subject to rules that reflect both democratic processes and individual
rights to liberty and to equal, dignified treatment.
A couple of examples may help us see the fundamental
normative questions underlying the basic structure of property law.
Consider the seemingly minor topic of beach access. The state of
Hawaii grants every person the right to go to the beach anywhere in
167
the state. Most states allow public recreational access to the wet
168
sand area up to the high-tide line. Unlike the rest of the country,
Massachusetts and Maine do not even allow public recreational uses

166. Compare NOZICK, supra note 142, at 171–72 (“Whether it is done through
taxation . . . or through seizure of profits, . . . principles of distributive justice involve
appropriating the actions of other persons. . . . [It] makes them a part-owner of you . . . .”), with
RAWLS, supra note 165, § 32.6, at 114–15 (“Among the basic rights is the right to hold and to
have the exclusive use of personal property. One ground of this right is to allow a sufficient
material basis for personal independence and a sense of self-respect . . . .”).
167. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77–78 (Haw. 1968); SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 90.
168. SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 87–90.
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169

of the privately held tidelands. In those states, public access rights
over the wet sand area up to the high-tide line are limited to
170
navigation and fishing purposes. Seaside owners own their beaches
171
down to the low-tide line and have the right to exclude all others. In
contrast, the state of Hawaii grants recreational beach access rights
not only on the wet sand up to the high-tide line but also on the dry
172
sand area up to the vegetation line. Shorefront owners have an
obligation to allow others to hang out on the dry sand beach in front
of their own homes; they simply do not own the right to exclude
173
others from this area.
This Hawaiian property rule may seem like a detail of the
property system rather than a core issue affecting the basic structure
of property—but nothing could be further from the truth. The law of
beach access in Hawaii has an enormous, incalculable impact on
social life. Though the law limits the property rights of beachfront
owners as they are defined elsewhere, it increases the wealth of every
single person in the state by giving them a right to go to the beach
anywhere in the state. Everyone, no matter how poor, has a backyard
on the beach. Individuals and families go the shore in the morning to
swim or surf before work. Families gather to watch the sun go down
in the evening. Even if they only have a small apartment inland, they
have a right to sit outside on the beach wherever they please. The
beach access rule dramatically shapes the character and quality of
social life. It is a right that Hawaiians have come to take for granted
and that most cherish. It affects the range of options people have,
their daily routine, and the sense of satisfaction of almost everyone.
Suppose a state court in Massachusetts decided to adopt the
Hawaiian rule. Would this constitute a taking of property without just
compensation? Four Justices on the Supreme Court would likely say
“yes” because this would constitute a taking of an “established right
of private property,” that is, the right to exclude nonowners from the
174
dry sand in front of one’s home. But perhaps not: after all, the
Supreme Court did hold that a California constitutional right to enter
169. See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 174–76 (Me. 1989); Opinion of the Justices,
313 N.E.2d 561, 568–71 (Mass. 1974); SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 88–89.
170. SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 88.
171. See id. at 88–89.
172. Id. at 89–90.
173. See In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77–78 (Haw. 1968); SINGER, supra note 33, § 2.8, at 90.
174. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2602 (2010) (plurality opinion); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 567.
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shopping centers to hand out leaflets did not violate the
175
constitutionally protected property rights of the owner. Neither the
federal public accommodations law nor the Fair Housing Act
constitutes a taking of property in violation of the Constitution even
though those statutes require owners to refrain from excluding
176
customers or tenants because of their race. Would it be unfair to
redistribute rights from beachfront owners to the public, or would this
merely constitute a modernization of a common law rule based on
changing social values? Should the rule adopted by the state courts in
Massachusetts in colonial times be immune from change, or should
the states that adopted one approach be entitled to move to another?
Would it constitute a taking of a public easement of beach access if
the Hawaii legislature were to adopt the Massachusetts rule?
Answering these questions requires us to consider the role of
beach access in social life and whether we understand legitimate
interests in that area to be static and immune to legislative change or
dependent on shifting understandings of the obligations that owners
owe and the rights that owners have. We must consider the kind of
social life our property norms reflect and shape and the distribution
of opportunities they embrace or exclude. We must consider the
legitimacy of various expectations and the justifiability of the exercise
of various powers. What do we have a right to expect? What
underlying framework is consistent with our best understanding of
the relative rights of beachfront owners and the general public? Is the
right to exclude others from the beach in front of one’s house one of
the types of property rights that democracies should no longer
recognize? Does it deny equal concern and respect to each person to
deny nonowners the right to go to the beach on terms that make it in
fact accessible to them?
Political, moral, and legal theory all help us think about these
questions because they define the contours of a democratic state.
Both moral and legal theory insist that we look at the issue from the
perspective of everyone affected by it. Can we give reasons for our
choices that could or should be accepted by those who have to live
with them? Modern political theory suggests that property rights

175. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–84 (1980).
176. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(holding that the public-accommodations law of 1964 does not constitute an unconstitutional
taking of property without just compensation). No challenges have been brought to the Fair
Housing Act on the ground that it takes property without just compensation.

SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2/20/2014 4:59 PM

PROPERTY AS THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY

1331

should be allocated and defined in a manner that accords with a basic
framework of society that is consistent with democratic political and
social values in a society characterized by pluralism in comprehensive
normative views. The basic values that democracies accept are
implicated in such decisions. What do liberty and equality mean in
this context? What opportunities do we think should be open to each
person? Is beach access one of them?
Libertarians like Nozick would probably say no; beach access is
not a necessity, and we are all better off allocating control over land
to private individuals who act as gatekeepers to their property.
Beachfront owners cannot enjoy privacy or security if strangers have
the right to sit in their backyard. Once private rights in beaches are
established, it would violate the reasons we created the state in the
first place to allow legislatures to deprive people of their duly
established property rights. But liberals like Rawls might approach
the question in another way entirely. What rule might we adopt if we
did not know whether we would be beachfront owners or whether we
would have enough money to buy such access? Would we choose to
allow a minority to monopolize enjoyment of beaches? The
libertarian way of posing the question is likely to result in favoring
exclusionary rights, while the liberal “veil of ignorance” reasoning is
more likely to favor public access. Figuring out which approach is the
best interpretation of our values of liberty, equality, and democracy is
necessary to answering the question of what we should do.
If this example seems too unimportant or esoteric, consider
subprime mortgages. Should we enact regulations that protect
borrowers from entering adjustable-rate mortgage agreements when
they are unlikely to be able to make the payments when the interest
rate goes up? The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a
jury might well conclude that it constitutes an unfair practice in
violation of the state’s consumer protection act to grant an adjustablerate mortgage-backed loan to a borrower when it was evident the
borrower did not have a sufficient income to pay back the loan when
177
the interest rate adjusted upwards. As the court stated there,
To issue a home mortgage loan whose success relies on the hope
that the fair market value of the home will increase during the
introductory period is as unfair as issuing a home mortgage loan

177. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 557–62 (Mass. 2008).
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whose success depends on the hope that the borrower’s income will
178
increase during that same period.

Similarly, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of
179
2010, passed as one part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
180
Consumer Protection Act, makes a consumer’s ability to repay a
181
condition for a creditor’s granting a residential mortgage. Final
regulations have now been issued that prevent the granting of highpriced mortgages to those who cannot afford them and provide
presumptive protection for “qualified mortgages” that meet certain
182
affordability criteria.
We could allow such agreements to be made on the libertarian
grounds that individuals should be free to make whatever agreements
they like and take whatever risks they please whether or not they
would agree if they had full information. Or we could ban them
because we have enough experience to know that the vast majority of
people who enter such agreements do so because they do not fully
understand them or because we are sure that almost everyone who
does so regrets it later. Is it better to have owned and lost than never
to have owned at all? Banning subprime mortgages could be justified
on the libertarian grounds that it prevents fraud or on the liberal
grounds that it establishes minimum standards of fair treatment for
consumers entering the marketplace, ensuring they get what they
think they are paying for. Allowing subprime mortgages arguably
promotes the autonomy of borrowers and lenders alike, making them
183
masters of their own fates. Which interpretation is better?
Answering this question requires normative judgments that
cannot be addressed by an economic cost-benefit analysis or a laserlike focus on the information costs of the alternative solutions.
Rather, we are confronted with a choice among values. Are subprime
mortgages a shining example of individuals exercising autonomy by

178. Id. at 554 (quotation marks omitted).
179. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit.
14, 124 Stat. 2136 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C.).
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2012).
182. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6408–09 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1026).
183. See Singer, supra note 64 (exploring the arguments for and against regulating the terms
of subprime mortgages).

SINGER IN PRINTER (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

2/20/2014 4:59 PM

PROPERTY AS THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY

1333

taking reasonable risks, or are they perfect examples of the ways
unscrupulous peddlers can pick our pockets? One might think that
libertarians would be happy to allow freedom of contract while
liberals would want consumer protection. But it is not clear that
libertarians should be so happy with deceptive sales techniques; after
all, deceptive sales practices shade into fraud, and fraud shades into
theft. Libertarians favor free choice, but they also favor strong
protection for property rights. For that reason, they are usually strong
opponents of fraud. Deceptive conduct promotes, not freedom of
contract, but deals the parties would not have made had they
understood what they were actually purchasing. And liberals may
worry that banning subprime mortgages deprives the poor of the only
path they have to home ownership.
Nor does efficiency theory give us a clean answer. If information
costs are a form of transaction cost, then the question is what
agreement the parties would (or would not) have made if they had
perfect information. As a counterfactual question, judgment needs to
be exercised to answer this question: Do we focus on the regret that
subprime mortgage borrowers feel when things go sour or their joy at
the initial deal that allowed them to buy a house? Do we accept the
reasoning of Professor Alan Schwartz, who argues that any
limitations on freedom of contract simply prevent people from
“do[ing] the best they can for themselves, given their
184
circumstances”? Or should we allow subprime mortgages on the
grounds that they are the only path for home ownership for the poor
or those with poor credit ratings? Or do we adopt the approach of
economist Joseph Stiglitz, who argues “[t]here was no point of putting
someone in a home for a few months and then tossing him out after
having stripped him of his life savings. But that was what the banks
185
were doing”? Should we protect people from decisions they are
very likely to regret and promote housing for poor people by methods
that do not leave them worse off than before? Whatever choice we
make, we will be establishing minimum standards for market
transactions consistent with the injunction to treat others with dignity
and respect.

184. Alan Schwartz, Justice and the Law of Contracts: A Case for the Traditional Approach,
9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 107, 108 (1986).
185. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF
THE WORLD ECONOMY 11 (2010).
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Figuring out whether to allow or prohibit beach access or
subprime mortgages depends on an interpretation of the values of
liberty, dignity, equality, and democracy. We have no magic formula
that tells us what those concepts mean. But that does not mean that
186
our consideration of what they entail is totally arbitrary. Despite the
contentious political debates between libertarians and liberals and
between utilitarian, deontological, and virtue theories of moral
187
reasoning, there are some values we hold to be “self-evident.” Both
libertarians and liberals favor equality, liberty, the rule of law, and
democratic government. That means that despite the heated rhetoric
surrounding the concept of “regulation,” there is an American
consensus that we need laws that establish rules of the road and
188
minimum standards for property and contract law. Those minimum
standards not only facilitate and coordinate free choices among
individuals and lower the costs of transactions and information about
ownership. They also establish norms of conduct consistent with our
commitment to treat each person with respect and dignity.
Because we are a society committed to the ideas of democracy
and human rights, we do not satisfy all preferences no matter what
they happen to be. Some preferences are off the table, so to speak.
We do not carefully consider the costs and benefits of adopting
slavery as a social or economic system; rather, we outlaw it as
inconsistent with the norms governing a free and democratic society
that treats each person with equal concern and respect. Similarly, we
do not allow strict foreclosure or unfair or deceptive business
practices, and we do not sit back and do nothing when bankers create
mortgages that wreck the world economy.
CONCLUSION
Property law is not simply about best management practices or
coordination in the face of scarcity. Democracies elect leaders who
pass laws that establish minimum standards for social and economic
relationships compatible with our justified expectations and our
considered judgments about what it means to treat others with dignity
and respect. Property law is not just a mechanism of coordination; it is

186. See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 9 (1994);
Singer, Normative Methods, supra note 55, at 903–05.
187. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
188. Singer, supra note 43, at 155–58.
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a quasi-constitutional framework for social life. Property is not
merely the law of things. Property is the law of democracy.

